2020 coronavirus pandemic in Japan

2020 coronavirus pandemic in Japan

Confirmed cases per million inhabitants
Disease	COVID-19
Virus strain	SARS-CoV-2
Location	Japan
First case	Kanagawa Prefecture
Arrival date	16 January 2020 (2 months and 2 days)
Origin	Wuhan, Hubei, China
Confirmed cases	873
Recovered	171
Deaths	29

The 2019–20 coronavirus pandemic was confirmed to have spread to Japan on 16 January 2020 from China.

On 27 February 2020, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe requested that all Japanese elementary, junior high, and high schools close until early April to help contain the virus. The outbreak has been a concern for the 2020 Summer Olympics which is scheduled to take place in Tokyo starting at the end of July. The Japanese government has thus been taking extra precautions to help minimise the outbreak's impact.

Timeline

COVID-19 cases in Japan  ()      Deaths        Recoveries        Active cases
Date			# of cases
2020-01-16		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	1(n.a.)
⋮		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	1(=)
2020-01-24		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	3(+200%)
2020-01-25		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	3(=)
2020-01-26		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	4(+33%)
2020-01-27		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	6(+50%)
2020-01-28		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	7(+16%)
2020-01-29		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	11(+57%)
2020-01-30		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	14(+27%)
2020-01-31		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	17(+21%)
2020-02-01		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	20(+18%)
⋮		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	20(=)
2020-02-04		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	23(+15%)
2020-02-05		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	25(+8.7%)
⋮		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	25(=)
2020-02-08		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	26(+4.0%)
⋮		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	26(=)
2020-02-12		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	28(+7.7%)
2020-02-13		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	33(+18%)
2020-02-14		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	41(+24%)
2020-02-15		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	53(+29%)
2020-02-16		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	59(+11%)
2020-02-17		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	65(+10%)
2020-02-18		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	73(+12%)
2020-02-19		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	85(+16%)
2020-02-20		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	93(+9.4%)
2020-02-21		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	105(+13%)
2020-02-22		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	132(+26%)
2020-02-23		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	144(+9.1%)
2020-02-24		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	157(+9.0%)
2020-02-25		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	164(+4.5%)
2020-02-26		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	186(+13%)
2020-02-27		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	210(+13%)
2020-02-28		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	230(+10%)
2020-02-29		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	239(+3.9%)
2020-03-01		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	254(+6.3%)
2020-03-02		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	268(+5.5%)
2020-03-03		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	284(+6.0%)
2020-03-04		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	317(+12%)
2020-03-05		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	349(+10%)
2020-03-06		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	408(+17%)
2020-03-07		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	455(+12%)
2020-03-08		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	488(+7.3%)
2020-03-09		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	514(+5.3%)
2020-03-10		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	568(+11%)
2020-03-11		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	620(+9.2%)
2020-03-12		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	675(+8.9%)
2020-03-13		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	716(+6.1%)
2020-03-14		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	780(+8.9%)
2020-03-15		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	814(+4.6%)
2020-03-16		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	829(+1.8%)
2020-03-17		​ ​ ​ ​ ​	873(+5.3%)
Data sourced from Japan Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare and World Health Organization, as reported from 10:00|CET on the day to 10:00|CET on the following day (18:00|JST on the day – 18:00|JST the following day).

January

A 30-year-old Chinese national who had previously travelled to Wuhan developed a fever on 3 January and subsequently returned to Japan on 6 January. He tested positive during a hospital admission between 10 and 15 January. He had not visited the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market, but possibly had close contact with an affected person in Wuhan. On 24 January, a second case was confirmed as a Chinese national who visited from Wuhan. On 25 January, the third case was confirmed as a woman from Wuhan.

Afterwards, Japan took extra precautions, due to the upcoming 2020 Summer Olympics being held in Tokyo. Despite this, on 28 January, the fifth, sixth and seventh cases were confirmed in Japan, including a man who had not visited Wuhan. The man was a tour bus driver who had driven a group from Wuhan earlier in January. The tour guide for the group was also confirmed positive for SARS-CoV-2. On 29 January, a Chinese man and woman in their 40s tested in Aichi and in Hokkaido.

On 30 January, three Japanese nationals who arrived at Haneda after being evacuated from Wuhan tested positive. Three other cases were confirmed later that day. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced that the two Japanese nationals who came back via Haneda refused further testing and said that officials could not legally force them to do so. It was announced on 31 January that the two had relented.

February

From 3 February, Japan would not admit anyone who had had history of travelling to and from Hubei Province or had a Chinese passport officially issued from Hubei. In addition, non-Japanese travellers were required to fill out health declaration questionnaires on whether they had (or would have) travelled to Hubei within the next 14 days.

On 11 February, two evacuees from Wuhan tested positive after an earlier test returned negative results. Another three cases were confirmed over the next two days, bringing the total count to 31.

On 12 February, Japan announced entry restrictions for anyone who had travelled to and from Zhejiang or had a Chinese passport issued from Zhejiang.

On 13 February, a woman in her 80s died in Kanagawa Prefecture, next to Tokyo, marking the first death from COVID-19 in Japan. She was the mother-in-law of a cab driver working in Tokyo who was also confirmed positive for the virus.

On 14 February, a married couple, both in their 60s, tested positive after returning from a ten-day vacation in Hawaii, during which the man began showing symptoms. On 16 February, it was reported that they had used Delta Air Lines to return to Tokyo from Oahu and stayed at the Grand Waikikian. Contact tracing was initiated by the airline to confirm whether anyone was infected.

On 18 February, Wakayama Prefecture announced that three people tested positive and one of them was admitted to Saisekai Arida Hospital. The other two were a doctor who tested positive and a nurse in his 30s who worked as a member of the Disaster Medical Assistance Team after being deployed to the Diamond Princess.

On 19 February, inspection of 3,011 cases on the Diamond Princess had been completed.

On 20 February, Fukuoka Prefecture announced its first virus case, a Japanese man in his sixties with no travel history overseas.

On 21 February, two elementary school boys in Hokkaido and one preschool school boy were confirmed positive for SARS-CoV-2, the latter had came back from an airlift out of Wuhan with his father, who was also tested. Diamond Princess ship passengers disembarked.

On 22 February, a junior high school teacher working in Chiba Prefecture tested positive for the virus.

On 23 February, the US State Department advised American visitors in Japan to be cautious due to the community spread of the virus. On the same day that the Nagoya Expressway Public Corporation announced plans to temporarily close some toll gates and let employees work from their homes after an employee staffing the toll gates was diagnosed positive for SARS-CoV-2. Due to personnel shortages, six toll gates on the Tōkai and Manba routes of the expressway network were closed over the weekend.

People in Tokyo wearing masks

On 27 February, Shinzo Abe requested closures of all elementary, junior high, and high schools to curb the spread of the infections from 2 March to the end of spring vacations, which usually conclude in early April.

March

On 4 March, the Shikoku region reported its first case in Tokushima Prefecture.

On 5 March, Japan announced new quarantine restrictions to be enforced for all visitors coming from China and South Korea. Shiga Prefecture also announced its first case.

On 6 March, South Korea protested the quarantine measures for South Koreans going to Japan by suspending visa privileges for Japanese travelling to South Korea.

On 16 March, NHK reported that the Japanese government plans to expand entry restrictions to foreigners from four new countries. They will apply to three areas in Spain (including Madrid), four areas in Italy (including the northern region of Liguria), Switzerland's Ticino region, and all of Iceland. Japan is currently restricting entry by foreigners who have recently visited China, South Korea, Italy and Iran.

Government response

Phase 1: Containment

The initial response of the Japanese government to the COVID-19 outbreak was a policy of containment that focused on the repatriation of Japanese citizens from Wuhan, the point of origin of the pandemic, and the introduction of new border control regulations.

On 24 January, PM Abe convened the "Ministerial Meeting on Countermeasures Related to the Novel Coronavirus" at the Prime Minister's Office with members of his Cabinet in response to a statement released by the World Health Organization (WHO) that morning which confirmed human-to-human transmission of the coronavirus. Abe announced that he would introduce appropriate countermeasures to the disease in coordination with the National Institute of Infectious Diseases (NIID).

On 28 January, PM Abe designated the new coronavirus as an "infectious disease" under the Infectious Diseases Control Law (Japanese: 感染症の予防及び感染症の患者に対する医療に関する法律), which allows the government to order patients with COVID-19 to undergo hospitalization. He also designed the disease as a "quarantinable infectious disease" under the Quarantine Act, which allows the government to quarantine people suspected of infection and order them to undergo diagnosis and treatment.

On 30 January, PM Abe announced the establishment of the "Novel Coronavirus Response Headquarters" (Japanese: 新型コロナウイルス感染症対策本部), which meets at the Prime Minister's Office and is run by a task force led by Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management Okita Yoshiki. The initial roster of the task force includes 36 high-ranking bureaucrats from several of the Ministries of Japan to coordinate government response to the COVID-19 outbreak. The Headquarters acts as the site of PM Abe's decision-making process on the country's virus countermeasures.

On 31 January, PM Abe announced during the Second Meeting of the Novel Coronavirus Response Headquarters that the government prioritized the repatriation of Japanese citizens from Hubei province. Officials negotiated with Chinese authorities to dispatch five chartered flights to Wuhan from 29 January to 17 February.

On 1 February, PM Abe announced during the Fourth Meeting of the Novel Coronavirus Response Headquarters that he would enact restrictions to deny entry of foreign citizens who had a history of visiting Hubei province within 14 days and those who possess a Chinese passport issued by Hubei province.

On 5 February, PM Abe announced that he would invoke the Quarantine Act to place the cruise ship Diamond Princess under quarantine in Yokohama. Quarantine officers were dispatched to the ship to prevent the disembarkation of crew and passengers, and to escort infected patients to medical facilities.

On 6 February, PM Abe invoked the Immigration Control and Refugee Act to deny the entry of the cruise ship MS Westerdam from Hong Kong after one of its passengers tested positive for COVID-19.

Prevention and treatment

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe convening the first Novel Coronavirus Expert Meeting on 16 February 2020

After the COVID-19 outbreak on the cruise ship Diamond Princess, the Japanese government shifted its focus from a containment policy to a prevention and treatment one because it anticipated rising numbers of community spreads within Japan. This policy prioritized the creation of a COVID-19 testing and consultation system based on the National Institute of Infectious Diseases (NIID) and the government's existing 83 municipal and prefectural public health institutions that is separate from the civilian hospital system. The new system handles the transfer of COVID-19 patients to mainstream medical facilities to facilitate patient flow, triage, and the management of limited testing kits on their behalf to prevent a rush of infected and uninfected patients from overwhelming healthcare providers and transmitting diseases to them. By regulating COVID-19 testing at the national level, the Abe Administration integrated the activities of the national government, the local governments, medical professionals, business operators, and the public in treating the disease.

On 1 February, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare instructed the municipal and prefectural governments to establish specialized COVID-19 consultation centres and outpatient wards at their local public health facilities by the first half of the month. Such wards would provide medical examinations and testing for suspected carriers of the disease to protect general hospitals from infection.

On 5 February, PM Abe announced during the Fifth Meeting of the Novel Coronavirus Response Headquarters that the government would begin preparations to strengthen COVID-19 testing capabilities at the NIID and 83 municipal and prefectural public health institutions that are designated by the government as official testing sites. Without any uniform diagnosis kit for the disease, the government has relied on polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests to check for infections. As few mainstream medical facilities in Japan had the ability to conduct PCR tests, Abe also promised to increase the number of institutions with such kits, including universities and private companies

On 12 February, PM Abe announced during the Seventh Meeting of the Novel Coronavirus Headquarters that the government would expand the scope of COVID-19 testing to include patients with symptoms based on the discretion of local governments. Previously, testing was restricted to those with a history of travelling to Hubei Province.　On the same day, the Ministry of Health and NIID also contracted SRL Inc to handle PCR clinical laboratory testing. Since then, the government has partnered with several more private companies to expand laboratory testing capabilities and to work towards the development of a rapid testing kit.

On 14 February, PM Abe introduced the Japanese government's coronavirus consultation system to coordinate medical testing and response with the public. The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare worked with local governments to establish 536 consultation centres (Japanese: 帰国者・接触者相談センター) that covered every prefecture within the country to provide concerned citizens with instructions on how to receive COVID-19 testing and treatment. The general public needs to contact a consultation centre by phone to get tested at one of the government's specialized outpatient wards (Japanese: 帰国者・接触者外来).

On 16 February, PM Abe convened the government's first Novel Coronavirus Expert Meeting (Japanese: 新型コロナウイルス感染症対策専門家会議) at the Prime Minister's Office to draft national guidelines for COVID-19 testing and treatment. The meeting was chaired by Dr. Wakita Takaji, Director of the NIID, who brought together ten public health experts and medical professionals from across Japan to coordinate a response to the virus with PM Abe and the government's coronavirus task force in a roundtable format. The main concern of the Japanese medical establishment was an overcrowding of hospitals by uninfected patients with light cold symptoms who believed that they had COVID-19. Medical representatives claimed that such a panic would strain medical resources and risk exposing those uninfected patients to the disease itself.

On 17 February, the Ministry of Health released its consultation guidelines (Japanese: 新型コロナウイルス感染症についての相談・受診の目安について) to each of the municipal and prefectural governments and their public health centers. The document instructs doctors and public health nurses who staff the consultation centres to limit consultations to people with the following conditions: (1) cold symptoms and a fever of at least 37.5 Celsius for over four days while taking antipyretic medication; and (2) extreme fatigue and breathing difficulties. The elderly, people with pre-existing conditions, and pregnant women with cold symptoms can receive consultation if they have had them for two days. The guidelines also note that people who are dissatisfied with their consultation results can visit one of the specialized outpatient wards (帰国者・接触者外来) for further talks.

Phase 2: Mitigation

The objective of the Japanese government's basic policies for control is to "flatten the curve".

On 25 February, the Abe Administration introduced the "Basic Policies for Novel Coronavirus Disease Control" (Japanese: 新型コロナウイルス感染症対策の基本方針) to act as the government's uniform basic policy on COVID-19 control. After a spike of infections in Italy, Iran, and South Korea, PM Abe decided that the government's disease countermeasures would prioritize the prevention of large-scale clusters in Japan. This includes the government's controversial requests to suspend such large-scale gatherings as community events and school operations, as well as its policy to limit patients with light cold symptoms from visiting medical facilities to prevent them from overwhelming hospital resources.

On 23 February, PM Abe instructed the government's coronavirus task force to quickly draft a comprehensive basic policy. Health Minister Katsunobu Kato reconvened the medical experts from the first Novel Coronavirus Expert Meeting on 24 February to draft this policy. During the meeting, the medical establishment presented its policy recommendations in the form of a views report (Japanese: 新型コロナウイルス感染症対策の基本方針の具体化に向けた見解), concluding that the most important objective of PM Abe's basic policy must be the prevention of large-scale disease clusters and a decrease in the outbreak and death of patients with severe symptoms. They stated that it is not possible for the government to prevent the spread of COVID-19 in Japan on a person-to-person basis, but that there is a possibility that it can regulate the overall speed of infection.  They cited the next week or two as a "critical moment" on whether the country would experience a large cluster that could result in the collapse of the medical system and socio-economic chaos. After reviewing and discussing the existing data on the disease, the committee stated that universal PCR testing was impossible due to a shortage of testing facilities and providers, and recommended that the government instead limit the application of available test kits to patients that are at a high risk of complications in order to stockpile for a large cluster.  Participants also noted that Japan's medical facilities are vulnerable to "chaos," elaborating that several of the hospital beds and resources in the Tokyo area are already preoccupied with caring for the surge of 700 infected patients from the Diamond Princess. They reiterated their warning that a rush of alarmed uninfected outpatients with light symptoms of the disease could overwhelm hospitals and turn waiting rooms into "breeding grounds" of COVID-19.

On 25 February, the Abe Administration adopted the "Basic Policies for Novel Coronavirus Disease Control" based on the advice that it received from the Expert Meeting.

First, the new policies advised local medical institutions that it is better for people with lighter, cold-like symptoms to rely on bed rest at home, rather than seeking medical help from clinics or hospitals. The policy also recommends people at a higher risk of infection -including the elderly and patients with pre-existing conditions – to avoid hospital visits for such non-treatment purposes as completing prescription orders by letting them fill the forms over the telephone instead of in person.

Second, the new policies allow general medical facilities in areas of a rapid COVID-19 outbreak to accept patients suspected of infection. Before this, patients could only get tested at specialized clinics after making an appointment with consultation centres to prevent the transmission of the disease. Government officials revised the previous policy after acknowledging that such specialized institutions would be overwhelmed during a large cluster.

Third, the policy asks those with any cold symptoms to take time off from work and avoid leaving their homes. Government officials urged companies to let employees work from home and commute at off-peak hours. The Japanese government also made an official request to local governments and businesses to cancel large-scale events.

On 27 February, PM Abe requested the closures of all schools from 2 March to the end of spring vacations, which usually conclude in early April. The next day, the Japanese government announced plans to create a fund to help companies subsidize workers who need to take days off to look after their children while schools are closed.

On 27 February, the Japanese government also announced plans to expand the national health insurance system so that it covers COVID-19 tests.

On 9 March, the Ministry of Health reconvened the Expert Meeting after the two week "critical moment." The panel of medical experts concluded that Japan was currently not on track to experience a large-scale cluster, but stated that there is a two-week time lag in analysing COVID-19 trends and that the country would continue to see more infections. Consequently, the participants asked the government to remain vigilant in quickly identifying and containing smaller clusters. With more COVID-19 outbreaks around the world, the panel also proposed that new infections from abroad could initiate a "second wave" of the disease in Japan.

On 9 March, the Health Ministry published a disease forecast of each prefecture and instructed their local governments to prepare their hospitals to accommodate its patient estimates. It predicts that the virus peak of each prefecture will occur three months after their first reported case of local transmission. The Ministry estimates that during its peak, Tokyo will see 45,400 outpatients and 20,500 inpatients per day, of whom 700 will be in severe condition. For Hokkaido, the figure is 18,300 outpatients and 10,200 inpatients daily, of whom about 340 will be in severe condition.

Cluster countermeasures

On 25 February, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare established a "Cluster Response Section" (Japanese: クラスター対策班) in accordance to the Basic Policies for Novel Coronavirus Disease Control. The purpose of the new section is to quickly identify and contain small-scale clusters of COVID-19 infections before they turn into large-scale ones. It is led by university professors Oshitani Hitoshi and Nishiura Hitoshi and consists of a contact trace team and a surveillance team from the National Institute of Infectious Diseases (NIID), a data analysis team from Hokkaido University, a risk management team from Tohoku University, and an administration team. Whenever a local government determines the existence of a cluster from hospital reports, the Ministry of Health dispatches the Section to that area to conduct an epidemiological survey and contact tracing. After the teams determine the original source of infection, the Ministry and local government officials enact countermeasures to locate, test, and place under medical surveillance anybody who may have come into contact with an infected person. They can also file requests to suspend infected businesses or restrict events from taking place there.

On 15 March, the Ministry of Health reported fifteen COVID-19 clusters in Japan. The largest cluster involves more than 80 people across four live music clubs in Osaka from concerts held in mid-February. Another cluster of 50 people occurred at an elderly day care centre in Nagoya in early March, which resulted in 12 deaths.

Legislative reforms

To provide a stronger legal basis for its COVID-19 countermeasures, the Abe Administration has proposed an amendment to the "Special Measures Act to Counter New Types of Influenza of 2012" that will allow it to declare a "state of emergency" and mandate the prohibition of large-scale gatherings and the movement of people during a disease outbreak. Currently, school closures and event cancellations are voluntary responses by the public and local governments.

On 5 February 2020, the Abe Administration's coronavirus task force initiated political debate on the introduction of emergency measures to combat the COVID-19 outbreak a day after the British cruise ship Diamond Princess was asked to quarantine. Initial debate focused on constitutional reform due to the task force's apprehension that the Japanese Constitution may restrict the government's ability to enact such compulsory measures as quarantines on the grounds that it violated human rights. After lawmakers representing almost all of the major political parties – including the Liberal Democratic Party, Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, and Democratic Party for the People – voiced their strong opposition towards this proposal and asserted that the Constitution allowed for emergency measures, the Abe Administration moved forward with legislative reform instead.

On 5 March 2020, Prime Minister Abe introduced a draft amendment to the "Special Measures Act to Counter New Types of Influenza of 2012". He met separately with the heads of five opposition parties on 4 March to promote a "united front" in passing the reforms. The new law would allow the national and prefectural governors to instruct residents to avoid unnecessary outings and to close such facilities as schools, day care centres, and social welfare facilities for the elderly. To allay the concerns of the opposition parties, Abe said he would include a two-year limit on the power to declare a state of emergency.

The Abe Administration plans to submit the revision bill to the National Diet on 10 March, and has coordinated with the opposition parties to have it passed by the Lower House on 12 March, and the Upper House on 13 March.

Government support measures

On 12 February, PM Abe announced during the Eighth Meeting of the Novel Coronavirus Response Headquarters that the government would secure a total of 500 billion yen for emergency lending and loan guarantees to small and medium enterprises affected by the COVID-19 outbreak. He also declared that his Cabinet would set aside 15.3 billion yen from contingency funds to facilitate the donation of isolated virus samples to relevant research institutions across the globe.

On 1 March, PM Abe evoked the Act on Emergency Measures for Stabilizing Living Conditions of the Public to regulate the sale and distribution of facial masks in Hokkaido. Under this policy, the Japanese government instructed manufactures to sell facial masks directly to the government, which would then deliver it to residents.

On 5 March, the Japanese government announced that it is organizing an emergency package by using a 270 billion yen ($2.5 billion) reserve fund for the current fiscal year through March to contain the virus and minimize its impact on an economy.

Controversies and criticisms

In late February, several Japanese media outlets reported that there were people with fever or other symptoms who could not be tested through the consultation centre system and had become "test refugees" (Japanese: 検査難民). Some of these cases involved patients with severe pneumonia. In reaction to this problem, the chairman of the Institute for Healthcare Governance Masahiro Kami claimed that many patients were refused to be tested due to their mild symptoms and criticized the Japanese government for setting testing standards that were too high and for lacking a response to patient anxiety.

On 26 February, the Minister of Health Katsunobu stated in the National Diet that a total of 6,300 samples were tested between 18 and 24 February, averaging 900 samples per day. Some representatives questioned the discrepancy of the actual number of people tested and the claim in the prior week that 3,800 samples could be tested per day.

South Korean media outlets have also compared the number of samples tested and the number of confirmed cases between Japan and South Korea, leading them to believe that there are more cases of the virus in Japan. This has led to speculations in South Korea that the decision not to increase the number of samples tested was influenced by the country's plans to host the 2020 Summer Olympics.

On the same day, more doctors reported that they were refused by the public health centres to test the patients. The Japan Medical Association announced that it would start a nationwide investigation and plan to cooperate with the government to improve the situation. The Ministry of Health also stated that it would look into the situation with the local governments.

According to an NHK News poll conducted from 6 to 9 March 2020, 6% of respondents strongly approved of the national government's response, while 43% somewhat approved, 34% somewhat disapproved and 13% strongly disapproved of the government response. Specifically, 69% viewed the closure of most schools as unavoidable, while 24% viewed the action as too drastic. Regarding the entry restrictions from China and South Korea, 36% strongly approved, 41% somewhat approved, 13% somewhat disapproved and 5% strongly disapproved. On the other hand, the South Korean government criticized the Japanese government for restricting Koreans from entering the country to prevent the disease, saying, "unreasonable and excessive measures".

Restriction on domestic travel

An announcement urging travellers to wash their hands in Tokaido Shinkansen

Apart from individual quarantine measures, Japan does not have any laws that allow the government to restrict the movement of people in order to contain the virus. Compliance with government requests to restrict movements is based on "asking for public cooperation to ‘protect people’s lives’ and minimize further damage to [the economy]".

Socio-economic impact

Shelves in a pharmacy in Japan sold out of masks on 3 February 2020

Prime Minister Shinzō Abe has said that "the new coronavirus is having a major impact on tourism, the economy and our society as a whole". Face masks have sold out across the nation and stocks of face masks are depleted within a day of new arrivals. There has been pressure placed on the healthcare system as demands for medical checkups increase. Chinese people have reported increasing discrimination. The health minister has pointed out that the situation has not reached a point where mass gatherings must be called off.

Aviation, retail and tourism sectors have reported decreased sales and some manufacturers have complained about disruption to Chinese factories, logistics and supply chains. Prime Minister Abe has considered using emergency funds to mitigate the outbreak's impact on tourism, of which Chinese nationals account for 40%. S&P Global noted that the worst hit shares were from companies spanning travel, cosmetics and retail sectors which are most exposed to Chinese tourism. Nintendo announced that they would delay shipment of the Nintendo Switch, which is manufactured in China, to Japan.

On 28 February 2020, according to Oriental Land, a leisure and amusement company confirmed report, Tokyo Disneyland, Tokyo DisneySea and Tokyo Disney Resort were temporarily closed from 29 February, with operations to resume in early April. The Comcast-owned Universal Studios Japan also announced a closure on the same day. The latter would also resume on 16 March. The governor of Hokkaido, Naomichi Suzuki, declared a state of emergency due to the high number of new infections and asked citizens to stay at home that following weekend.

Sports

The outbreak itself has been a concern for the 2020 Summer Olympics which is scheduled to take place in Tokyo starting at the end of July. The national government has thus been taking extra precautions to help minimise the outbreak's impact. The Tokyo organising committee and the International Olympic Committee have been monitoring the outbreak's impact in Japan.

Additionally, the outbreak has affected professional sports in Japan. Nippon Professional Baseball's preseason games and the Haru Basho sumo tournament in Osaka were announced to be held behind closed doors, while the J.League (soccer) and Top League (rugby) suspended or postponed play entirely. Horseracing events are remain normal schedule, but spectators cannot enter racecourse and cannot bet at offtrack betting. Customers can only bet at internet and telephone.

Entertainment

On 26 February, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has suggested that major sporting, cultural and other events should be cancelled, delayed or scaled down for about two weeks amid the new coronavirus outbreak.

On 27 February, AnimeJapan 2020, originally scheduled to be held in Tokyo Big Sight in late March, was announced to be cancelled.

Affected by the shortage of outsourced staff due to the COVID-19 outbreak, many Japanese animated films and TV shows announced changes or postponed broadcasts due to production problems, including A Certain Scientific Railgun T (deferred for broadcast, changed to rebroadcast), Asteroid in Love, A3! (Delay extension), Kukuriraige -Sanxingdui Fantasy- (Delay extension), etc.

Aid to China

On 26 January, Japanese people donated a batch of epidemic prevention masks and delivered them to Wuhan after Sichuan Airlines arrived in Chengdu. According to "liberal digital times" of Taiwan, it believes that instead of donating from Japan, China bought from Japan, but according to Japanese media reports and the Japanese Consulate General in Chongqing stated that it was a donation.

On 3 February, four organizations, the Japan Pharmaceutical NPO Corporation, the Japan Hubei Federation, Huobi Global, and Incuba Alpha, donated materials to Hubei and wrote, "Is it clothesless? With the same clothes." (From "Book of Songs · Qin Feng · No Clothes") and "An Exotic Mountain and River, Same Wind and Moon".

On 10 February, Liberal Democratic Party's Secretary General Toshihiro Nikai said at a press conference after the cadre meeting that the outbreak of coronavirus in mainland China has expanded, The Liberal Democratic Party will deduct 5,000 yen from the March funding of members of the party to provide mainland China with support funds.

Incidents

On 1 February, a 37-year-old man of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department working for the Cabinet Secretariat, which was responsible for the evacuation of citizens from Wuhan and other related matters, died at National Institute of Public Health in Saitama Prefecture. The institute was where some of the evacuees from Wuhan stayed under temporary quarantine. Police are investigating the man's cause of death, but they suspect he was suicidal.

International restrictions on entry from Japan

The following countries and territories have restricted entry from Japan:

• India
• Israel
• Iraq
• Kuwait
• Saudi Arabia
• South Korea
• Bahrain
• Bangladesh: applies to visitors without "coronavirus-free medical certificates"
• Bhutan
• Ghana
• Gibraltar
• North Korea
• Malaysia: Entry ban only covers Hokkaido.
• Mongolia
• Nepal
• Kazakhstan
• Kyrgyzstan
• Lebanon
• Syria
• Tajikistan
• Turkmenistan
• Micronesia
• Vanuatu
• French Polynesia
• Cook Islands
• Marshall Islands
• Trinidad and Tobago
• Samoa
• Kiribati
• Tuvalu
• Solomon Islands
• Comoros
• Papua New Guinea
• Saint Lucia
• Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
• Sint Maarten

Additional information on cases

{{2019–20 coronavirus pandemic data/Japan medical cases}

External links

• "新型コロナウイルス感染症について" [About Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)] (in Japanese). Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. Retrieved 11 March 2020. – includes situation reports of the outbreak in Japan.
  • In English: "About Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)". Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. Retrieved 11 March 2020.
• Coronavirus COVID-19 Global Cases and historical data by Johns Hopkins University